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LEARNING TO BUILD A SUPPLY NETWORK:  
AN EXPLORATION OF DYNAMIC BUSINESS MODELS 
ABSTRACT 
Firms are confronted with the challenge of learning how to develop and manage supply 
networks, which reduce their operating costs and maximize their effectiveness in the 
marketplace. In pursuit of such goals they are increasingly turning to the use of dynamic 
business models.  Dynamic business models represent continuous change and therefore make 
firms learn constantly new and better ways of doing things.   These changes are manifestations 
of inter-firm knowledge transfer.  The aim of this research is to explore dynamic business 
models as an example of inter-firm knowledge transfer.  Adopting a case study approach, we 
examine three components of dynamic business models, 1) network structure, 2) inter-firm 
routines and 3) knowledge forms and describe their integration through a problem solving 
approach to building an offshore supply network.  Our empirical findings suggest that dynamic 
business models help organizations identify and link key actors with each other (at the firm and 
individual level), and aid the identification and specification of appropriate knowledge types 
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LEARNING TO BUILD A SUPPLY NETWORK:  
AN EXPLORATION OF DYNAMIC BUSINESS MODELS 
INTRODUCTION 
Confronted with the challenge of learning how to build supply networks that reduce operating 
costs and maximize effectiveness in the marketplace firms are increasingly adopting dynamic 
business models (Schweizer, 2005). Dynamic business models are conceptualized as the 
emergent outcomes of preconceived network structures built through the development of 
routines that guide problem solving (Hamel et al., 1994; Morris et al., 2005).  Business models 
have received much attention in the outsourcing (Fill et al., 2000; Jennings, 2002; Scheuing, 
1999), industrial network (Jűttner et al., 2006) and strategy (Morgan, 2003; Quinn, 1999; Wang 
et al., 1997) literature.  A principal implication of this literature is that dynamic business 
models constantly evolve as managers and frontline workers learn new and better ways of 
doing things (c.f.Hamel, 2000). While there is considerable agreement about the value of 
dynamic business models (Cohen et al., 2006; Kodama, 2004; Papagiannidis et al., 2005) the 
specification of how knowledge is accumulated, shared and applied is less clear.   
 Learning can be understood as the improvement of practices resulting from knowledge 
transfer among firms (see for example, Bångens et al., 2002; Brown et al., 1998; Cook et al., 
1999).  Learning how to build a supply network requires managers to build problem-solving 
capability to facilitate improvements to structures and routines within (c.f. Argote, 1982; 
Argote et al., 2000; Morris et al., 2005; Zollo et al., 2002) and between firms in the supply 
network (Möller et al., 2006).  In this way, a firm’s ability to co-create and transfer knowledge 
within the network seems likely to be central to the building and continuous development of 
dynamic business models.  Yet the concepts of learning and knowledge transfer have not been 
applied in work that highlights the dynamic character of business models.  The aim of this 
paper is to go some way towards addressing this gap through the exploration of dynamic 
business models as an illustration of inter-firm knowledge transfer. 
 This study focuses on the building of an Offshore business model; specifically, a supply 
network in an emerging market (Doh, 2005; Farrell, 2005).  The Offshore business model is 
conceptualized around the premise that the core firm seeks to generate cost advantages and 
utilize capabilities by working with firms based in less developed countries (Levy, 2005).  
Offshore business models are ‘dynamic’ as they denote significant change for the actors over a 
sustained period, and so represent an appropriate setting to explore how managers learn to build 
supply networks.  Adopting a case study approach, we examine three components of business 
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models; 1) network structure, 2) inter-firm routines and 3) forms of knowledge and describe 
their integration through a problem solving approach.  Specifically, we ask; how is inter-firm 
knowledge transfer involved in the creation of dynamic business models? 
 In exploring this question, the paper starts with an examination of previous research to 
arrive at a conceptualization of the iterative process of building a supply network through the 
use of dynamic business models. A description of the empirical study is then presented.  The 
discussion of empirical results suggests that different types of knowledge are transferred and 
co-created through ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ inter-firm knowledge transfer mechanisms.  The ‘hard’ and 
‘soft’ knowledge transfer mechanisms interact in a way that makes the business model 
dynamic.  Transparency of inter-firm knowledge transfer mechanisms, amongst actors, makes 
the transfer and co-creation of new knowledge easier.  The paper concludes with theoretical 
and managerial implications of findings.  
 
DYNAMIC BUSINESS MODELS AND INTER-FIRM KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER  
Dynamic Business Models 
With the escalating use of the term ‘business models’ in the business press and increasing 
recognition of their value as a managerial tool for capturing, sharing and realizing strategic 
intent, recent research has focused on clarifying the business model concept (Linder et al., 
2000; Morris et al., 2005; Schweizer, 2005).  This research is grounded in the observations of 
Hamel and Parahald (1994) who identify two cornerstones of business models explored in this 
literature; 1) structure: how firms perceive the structure of their firm, their business network 
and their position within it and 2) routines: how firms develop effective operational routines to 
exploit the potential value of the network.  
 Structure has been explored from a firm perspective and a network perspective.  At the 
firm level, internal hierarchies, their departments and their functions have been shown to affect 
organizational efficiency and effectiveness (Hayek, 1945; Kodama, 2004; Wildavsky, 1983).   
Similarly, at the network level, the way firms identify, interact and exploit network value has 
been shown to influence organizational performance and learning (Lampel et al., 2003; Möller 
et al., 2006).  Principally, information and knowledge flows (vertically and horizontally) within 
organizational and network structures appear to affect organizational performance (Araujo et 
al., 2003; Bångens et al., 2002).  
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 In contrast, routines have largely been explored at the level of the firm and focus on the 
development of a firm’s dynamic capabilities (Salvato, 2003; Zollo et al., 2002; Zuniga-
Vicente et al., 2006).  Zollo and Winter (2002: 340) define dynamic capabilities as  
“…a learned and stable pattern of collective activity through which the organization 
systematically generates and modifies its operating routines in pursuit of improved 
effectiveness.”   
While the dynamic capabilities literature recognizes that the external environment affects 
learning (Argote, 1982; Teece et al., 1997), and that routines evolve as a result of dialogue and 
interaction within and across units, departments or functions, these studies have not attempted 
to adopt a network perspective1 or explore how firms co-evolve inter-firm routines within their 
business network.  This observation is important for two reasons.  First, it suggests a 
relationship between the structures and routines captured by a firm’s business model.  Second, 
it suggests a constant and iterative need for creating and sharing ‘know-how’ to drive 
improvements to both structure and routines (Kogut et al., 1992; Nelson et al., 1982; Teece et 
al., 1997; Zahra et al., 2006; Zollo et al., 2002).  This makes the business model ‘dynamic’ in a 
way that moves beyond the boundaries of the firm.  In line with this literature we 
conceptualized dynamic business models as preconceived organizational and network 
structures built through the development of interdependent operational and administrative 
routines that evolve through problem solving activities.   
 Additionally, the extant literature suggests organizations conceptualize their business 
models in a sequence; managers first conceive the structure of the network they wish to build 
(c.f. Morris et al., 2005).  Routines are then established to support work and knowledge flows 
(Bångens et al., 2002; Brown et al., 1998).  Finally, as the networked organizations encounter 
problems, problem solving generates the development of knowledge that feeds back into 
improved structures and routines in a cyclical way.  Thus, dynamic business models evolve 
through inter-firm learning and knowledge transfer (c.f. Zollo et al., 2002).   
 The dynamic business model sequence described suggests that the way managers model 
their initial network structure is likely to affect the routines that emerge.  For example,  
the geographically dispersed structure of an offshore business model may result in less frequent 
face-to-face meetings with senior personnel, supported by frequent and detailed written reports 
in order to track work-in-progress (WIP).  Conceivably, a network structure that encompasses 
only local firms may evolve different routines for WIP monitoring.  In this regard, the initial 
                                                 
1 For a detailed discussion on the network perspective see Anderson, Håkansson and Johanson (1994). 
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network structure brings cultural and institutional influences to bear on the application of 
shared knowledge and practices (Gertler, 2003; Whitley, 2005), that co-evolve through problem 
solving activities.  


























Problem Solving in Dynamic Business Models 
Problem solving has been a recurrent theme in the knowledge transfer and organizational 
learning literature (Argyris, 1977; Bångens et al., 2002; Brown et al., 1998; Hayek, 1945).  
Argyris, (1977:116) defines learning in terms of problem solving.  He explains, “Learning is a 
process of detecting and correcting error”. In this way problem solving is manifest in changes 
to practices, structures and routines. Problems faced by firms seeking to reduce their cost base 
might be solved by seeking outsourcing or offshoring activities that change their network 




Knowledge Transfer (1) 
(Revisions as part of an iterative process) 
Knowledge Transfer (2) 
(Revisions as part of an iterative process) 

















Forms of Knowledge 
• Experience accumulation 
• Knowledge articulation 
• Knowledge codification 
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Problem Solving and Network Structure 
 In order for organisations to operate as part of a network, the organisational and network 
structures need to interact (Araujo et al., 2003).  New network structures associated with the 
offshore business models may present problems that could be solved by changes to 
organisational level structures.  In this way, organisational structures form the substructures of 
network structures.  Consequently, to maximise the effectiveness of network interactions and 
the resultant improvements to structure, we need to understand the relationship between inter-
firm knowledge transfer and improvements to network structure (see Figure 1; Knowledge 
Transfer (1)).  To date, there has been little research in this area.  The research that does exist 
tends to focus on either: 1) how organisations are structured to facilitate intra-firm learning (see 
for example, Dunbar et al., 2006; Hayek, 1945) or 2) how networks are structured to facilitate 
inter-firm learning. Karamanos (2003), for example, recognizes the value of knowledge transfer 
within networks and links this to network structures. Despite the valuable contributions from 
these studies, the interactions within network structures (at the network and organisational 
level) and inter-firm knowledge transfer has largely been ignored; this represents an important 
gap in the current literature.  
 
Problem Solving and Inter-firm Routines 
Routines have been defined as “a repetitive, recognizable pattern of interdependent actions, 
involving multiple actors”, (Feldman et al., 2003:96).  Every time a customer places an order, a 
series of predictable and interrelated actions are initiated which conclude with delivery.  Much 
effort has been dedicated to exploring and understanding the role of routines in improving 
organizational effectiveness (Feldman, 2000; Feldman et al., 2003; Nelson et al., 1982).  
However, little attention has been given to the role of inter-firm routines that co-evolve as 
components of the dynamic business model.  Consider our example of the Offshore business 
model.  When these new network structures are introduced firms are faced with new problems 
associated with tracking and monitoring outsourced work.  In this context, problem solving 
drives improvements to inter-firm work-in-progress review routines (see Figure 1. Knowledge 
Transfer (2)).  This is consistent with the description of the knowledge evolution cycle.  This 
cycle models an interactive process of constant improvement from problem identification to 
evaluation, problem solving and retention through emergent improvement in practice.     
 Three forms of knowledge that have been widely shown to influence practice are: 1) 
experience accumulation, 2) knowledge articulation and 3) knowledge codification (Glynn et 
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al., 1994; Zollo et al., 2002).  Experience accumulation can be understood as accumulation of 
tacit knowledge where knowledge is experiential (Schultz, 2006).  Knowledge articulation is 
concerned with how individuals and groups figure out what does and what does not work.  
Knowledge codification is the systemisation of understanding the performance implications of 
specific ways of doing things.  Knowledge codification in a network context might take the 
form of contracts, review procedures or decision support systems.  However, the creation and 
inter-firm transfer of this knowledge requires resources and investment. Zollo and Winter 
(2002) suggest that problem features (for example, frequency, memory of individuals involved 
in the task, the costs of coordinating the task) affect the appropriateness of the knowledge form. 
This suggests that knowledge transfer investments are likely to be an important consideration 
for firms striving to improve their dynamic business models. 
 As we have seen, much of this literature suggests a relationship either between structure 
and knowledge transfer or routines and knowledge transfer. We know very little of inter-
relationships between these cornerstones of dynamic business models.  Exploration of these 
relationships may help generate valuable insights into our understanding of inter-firm 
knowledge transfer.  Hence, we ask, how is inter-firm knowledge transfer involved in the 
creation of dynamic business models?  To explore this issue we ask two further questions: 
What are the types of knowledge that make the business model dynamic?  How are these 
knowledge types transferred between actors within the supply network? 
 
EMPIRICAL STUDY 
This longitudinal study was designed to identify and record the types of knowledge that were 
created and shared between actors, as they learned to build a supply network (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Pettigrew, 1990).  The study focuses on a single business model of an offshore supply network 
in the aerospace industry.  Using the method of a single case study (Easton, 2003; Flyvbjerg, 
2007; Halinen et al., 2005), the exploration of an offshore dynamic business model is likely to 
generate in-depth insight into how firms use inter-firm knowledge transfer to improve their 
effectiveness in the marketplace.  Empirical data were collected between October 2004 and 
March 2006 from the three firms in the business model; Alpha (the core firm), Bravo (the 
Europe based supplier) and Charlie (the India based supplier).  These companies were selected 
because of their endeavors to undergo a significant level of inter-firm knowledge transfer that 
enables them to work together in achieving three agreed objectives: 1) to generate cost savings, 
2) to utilize design capabilities of engineering service providers and 3) to develop sourcing 
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agreements with other offshore firms.  All firms and employees have been renamed, using the 
phonetic alphabet, to protect their identity.  The collected data included personal interviews, 
contracts, minutes of meetings, quarterly reports and various procedure and review documents that 
represented the codified knowledge emerging from interactions between all three firms.  Other 
sources of data included detailed field notes that recorded our impressions from each visit and archive 
materials. It was a key requirement of the research design to discover who was responsible for 
developing and managing the business model.  Key informants included the heads of each of the key 
functions involved in the offshore business model, the managers and the heads of each work stream 
from both Alpha and Bravo (see Figure 3).  Thus, directors, middle managers and executives and 
front-line workers were identified as the most relevant sources as their day-to-day involvement with 
strategic development and operations cast them in this role (Table 1).  
Table 1: Interviews 
  
Company Seniority of 
interviewees 




Alpha Senior Buyer Chris 3 3 2 
 Director Peter 2 2 -  
 Senior Manager John 3 3 2 
 Director Gary 2 2 2 
 Work Stream Head Steve 1 1 1 
 Work Stream Head Brian 1 1 1 
 Work Stream Head Luis 1 1 1 
Bravo Director Mike 2 2 2 
 Senior Manager Steve not yet employed 2 2 
 Work Stream Head Tony 2 2 - 
Total no. of interviews 49 
 
 
 As our objective was to generate in-depth insight, more weight was placed on the repeated 
semi-structured, personal interviews with the above key informants (Yin, 1994). A total of forty-nine 
interviews were carried out.  We developed a guide for conducting the semi-structured interviews 
based on the conceptualization of the dynamic business model (Figure 1.).  The guide helped us 
explore inter-firm knowledge transfer used for different problem solving activities.  We consider the 
companies’ task of ‘learning to build a supply network’ as a knowledge transfer process in 
which actors identify and solve problems.  In this way, the evidence that learning has occurred 
is manifested in changes of practices, for example, changes in structures and routines. At the 
beginning of each interview, respondents were asked to describe and explain the network structures 
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and inter-firm routines that they had recently been involved in establishing and developing. The 
remainder of the interview consisted of open questions based around the changes made to business 
practice and why, how, when and with which actors the changes were developed.  The interviews 
covered the same broad issues with each respondent.  Respondents were re-interviewed 
approximately every three months through the period of the study (subject to availability).   The 
geographic distance between the offshore firm, Charlie, and the researchers, made it impossible 
to secure face-to-face interviews.  This meant that we had to rely on second hand reports from 
Alpha and Bravo respondents and minutes from meetings and procedural documents. 
 Interviews typically lasted around two hours. They were conducted individually, and were 
audio-recorded and transcribed.  Data analysis placed a significant emphasis on verbatim quotations 
from informants.  All recorded interviews were analyzed via methods of inductive reasoning and 
comparative methods.  Following the procedure recommended by Strauss and Corbin (1998), three 
types of coding were adopted to analyze the data.  First, ‘open coding’ was used to discover and 
identify the properties and dimensions of concepts in the data.  Second, ‘axial coding’ was employed 
to link the core categories together at the level of properties and dimensions.  Third, ‘selective coding’ 
was used as a process of integrating and refining theory.  To organize this process, a systematic 
approach to the analysis of transcripts was adopted in a procedure akin to that of Turner (1981). 
Analysis was carried out simultaneously with data collection creating an iterative process between 
interviews, literature reviews and analysis.  The case analysis that follows illustrates both 
successful and unsuccessful knowledge transfer in the building of the supply network. 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section we discuss the empirical findings of the study.   
Inter-firm Knowledge Transfer in the Pre-contract Period: Months 0-6 
For some years Alpha had subcontracted design engineers from local agencies, at an hourly 
rate, to cope with the peaks and troughs associated with industry demand.  Local agencies 
supplied locally based design engineers (referred to as “bums on seats”) that were managed 
and supervised in-house by Alpha engineers.  When a specific job was completed, the 
subcontracted design engineers left.  However, in 2004 Alpha undertook a major make/buy 
review of engineering services.  The review suggested that working continuously with a group 
of ‘offshore’ design engineers might leverage both efficiency and effectiveness for Alpha.  The 
review highlighted the rapid development of engineering service providers, creating a market in 
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countries with a very low cost basis.  This faced Alpha with the opportunity and challenge of 
developing a new network structure through the sourcing of specialist, overseas, design 
engineering at low variable cost; something they had not previously done.  As a result of the 
make/buy analysis Alpha’s four-stage contract review process was initiated (see Figure 2).   
 
Figure 2.  Alpha’s Review Process for Strategic Sourcing 
Contract Review Board (CRB) 
 CRB 1:  
Strategy Outline 
 CRB 2:  
Pre-Negotiation 
               CRB 3:  
               Post Negotiation 
CRB 4:  
In Contract Review 
          Strategic Sourcing 
 process over time      
Make/Buy 
Analysis 







Activities that feed into Contract Review Boards 
 
Key: 
CRB: Contract Review Board 
RFI: Request for Information 
RFP: Request for Progress 
 
The outcome of the first Contract Review Board (CRB1) was to conceptualize an offshore 
business model for the strategic sourcing of specified design engineering services.  Following 
this review, Alpha identified six potential suppliers from their experience and knowledge of the 
marketplace.  These suppliers were contacted and Alpha personnel spent time with each 
supplier discussing the broad strategic aim of the offshore business model.  Next, CRB 2 was 
carried out.  Using their new knowledge of potential suppliers, Alpha identified their ‘most 
desirable outcome’ and their ‘least acceptable alternative’, to create parameters for negotiation 
with potential suppliers.  Alpha then held a Supplier Conference and asked potential suppliers 
to demonstrate; 1) their potential to develop a supply network in the medium and long-term, 
and 2) their ability to manage outsourced work, offshore.   Chris [Alpha] explained, “by this 
time [the time of the conference] we’d already got our eye on Bravo and [A.N.other], as 
possibly the only two [firms] that could really provide a solution…”  
 As a result of their interactions with suppliers at this conference, Alpha invited three firms 
to tender.  The offshore business model was being continuously developed through interactions 
with suppliers during the conference and tendering process. The network structure captured in 
the business model (Figure 3.) was an emergent outcome of inter-firm knowledge articulation 
as the actors worked out together, what they wanted to achieve.  The dynamic business model 
was used as a managerial tool for codifying knowledge needed to build the supply network; it 
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illustrated the interactions between the organizations in an attempt to show how the supplier 
network was going to work.  In this sense, the business model was trying to capture the actors’ 
understanding of the types of knowledge needed and how it will be shared.  The network 
structure represented the ‘hard’ architecture of the business network through which knowledge 
could transfer (Hasselbladh et al., 2000; Morris et al., 2005). 
 











 A Europe-based provider (Bravo) was awarded the contract nearly six months after the initial 
approach from Alpha.  Gary [Alpha] explained, “In the end there wasn’t really a choice… one 
company stood out a mile…”, Chris observed, “They [Bravo] were the only company that got 
it”.  Alpha felt that the majority of suppliers at the conference did not understand their offshore 
business model.  Chris commented, “I couldn’t close the gap…I couldn’t get them [the other 
suppliers] to grasp the issue of the business model being new and not business as usual.”   
 Why was this?  Interestingly, two suppliers at the conference had previously 
subcontracted to Alpha through the ‘bums on seats’ approach.  They did not appear to accept 
Alpha’s new objective, to shift to a long-term relationship approach where interactions between 
firms would promote joint problem solving.  The unsuccessful suppliers remained focused on 
‘cost reduction’.  This gave Alpha serious quality concerns.   Chris explained, “I finished my 
presentation with a slide that I overlaid with ‘our reputation in your hands’, but they just didn’t 
get it.” 
 Alpha was using the conference to facilitate interaction and learning between the actors.  
At this stage the type of  knowledge the actors wanted to transfer seemed to be framed around 
















Heavier lines indicate a greater frequency of communication flows.   
Arrows indicate the direction of communication flows 
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be realized (articulated by the potential suppliers).  The business model aim might usefully be 
labeled as the actors’ need to ‘know-what’ is to be achieved, while the second type of 
knowledge being sort pertains to the more familiar concept of ‘know-how’(Bångens et al., 
2002; Brown et al., 2000).   
 As an inter-firm knowledge transfer mechanism, the conference worked well for Bravo 
and Alpha, but not for the other suppliers.  Alpha and Bravo were learning by talking to each 
other, through social interaction (Amin, 2003).  Alpha explained how they codified their 
aggregated knowledge in criteria for the invitation to tender.  The other potential suppliers did 
not appear to draw on the articulated knowledge at the supplier conference, but instead referred 
back to their previous experience with Alpha’s historic cost focus.  Their previous experience 
of routine dealings with Alpha was framing the way they interpreted the business model that 
Alpha tried to present.  In contrast, Bravo, used a professional communications company to 
help codify their ‘know-what’ knowledge of the offshore business model into a detailed tender 
document.  Gary observed that this document had, “a clear and consistent strategic aim 
running all the way through it...which closely matched ’what’ we’d been talking about…” 
(Emphasis added).  
 This suggests that Bravo’s investment in the codification of ‘know-what’ and ‘know-how’ 
put the right type of  learning into an effective form for inter-firm knowledge transfer, and thus 
provided, “a convincing picture… they [Bravo] showed us they knew where we wanted to be, 
and that they had some ideas about ‘how’ they were going to help us get there.”  (Chris; 
emphasis added).  Our impression was that Bravo and Alpha had a positive, shared vision.  The 
key actors appeared to like each other and to genuinely want to help each other make the 
offshore business model work.  There seemed to be an acceptance between the actors that both 
companies were entering “uncharted waters” and that both had to learn. 
 Bravo’s tender document added details to the business model to include Bravo’s use of 
an offshore supplier – Charlie.    Alpha would put ‘work packages’ to Bravo at a hourly flat-
rate for work done, regardless of the work type; Bravo would identify the ‘high-skill’ work, to 
be carried out by themselves and the ‘low-skill’ work would be outsourced to Charlie.  Bravo 
would then return the completed work package to Alpha.  The more work Bravo sent offshore, 
the higher their margin.  The hourly flat-rate calculation was based on Alpha’s work stream 
forecasts, with Bravo earning a 6% net margin.  The knowledge type being co-created is 
‘know-what’ and ‘know-where’.  The actors needed to identify what tasks will be carried out 
where in the network. 
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 An interesting feature of the tender document was that it outlined some of the ‘soft’ 
inter-firm knowledge transfer mechanisms whereby actors would work together to continue the 
development of the business model.  The objective was to help actors learn from the 
experiences of each other.  This is what Nohria et al. (1997) refer to as the social production of 
new knowledge and focuses around the interactions between actors as they support each other 
in their daily practices.  Wenger (1998) labels these social networks of learning as 
‘communities of practice’.  In our case, we could see an inter-firm community of practice being 
engineered despite the fact that there would be several hundred miles between the firms.  
‘Space’ between actors has become an important focus for researchers endeavoring to 
understand knowledge transfer (Amin, 2003; Faulconbridge, 2006; Spring, 2003).  Principally, 
Amin (2003) argues that space need not be a barrier to inter-firm knowledge transfer, but that 
to facilitate knowledge transfer, firms must invest and support geographically dispersed 
communities of practice. 
 To engineer a geographically dispersed community of practice Alpha, Bravo and 
Charlie agreed to each assign a team dedicated to developing the offshore business model.  At 
this point, inter-firm knowledge articulation would become central to building the network.  
John [Alpha] explained,  
“If we’re putting this work out, we can’t just expect them [Bravo and Charlie] to pick 
it up.  There has to be a learning curve.  And we can help them in that… it’s in our 
interest.” 
The level of detail of how these problems might be solved became more ambiguous.  Indeed, 
the nature of the problems was not explicit.  In this way, the problem solving approach that the 
business model tried to foster required the development of softer, less explicit knowledge 
transfer mechanisms such as those captured by the concept of communities of practice.  The 
tender document suggested a series of meetings would be held between senior representatives 
of Alpha and Bravo.  The Bravo representative would visit Charlie.  Charlie would begin 
‘approved supplier’ procedure with Alpha.  These descriptions of events established the initial 
knowledge mechanisms between the actors.  In this regard, Bravo’s tender document focused 
on hard inter-firm knowledge transfer mechanisms; specifically inter-firm routines.  Hard 
mechanisms provided the architecture to support the soft social mechanisms by which 
individual actors might build a platform for social knowledge production.  This is concordant 
with the observations of Hargadon (1998) who suggest that hard and soft knowledge transfer 
mechanisms are inextricably linked and may more helpfully be seen as part of a continuum of 
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knowledge transfer rather than as a dichotomy of two distinct mechanisms.  This point is 
further illustrated when we explore the different forms that knowledge takes.   
 While experience [accumulation] was explicitly recognized as a valuable form of 
knowledge, knowledge articulation would take the form of inter-firm reviews and knowledge 
codification would result in standard recording procedure documents for shared inter-firm 
routines.  Inter-firm routines represented the hard inter-firm knowledge transfer mechanisms 
that would be used in the early stages of the dynamic business model.  They represented the 
manager’s understanding of the types of knowledge needed to be transferred: know-what, and 
know-how.  In this sense, it was easier for the tender document to capture the mechanisms for 
generating ‘know-what’ and ‘know-how’ but difficult to capture the significance of the deeper 
learning associated with ‘know-why’.  That is, to present justification for the ‘know-how’ 
decisions.  This has important implications for the effectiveness of problem solving as the 
supply network develops. 
 The tender document and the following inter-firm discussions provided the grounding 
for the codification of knowledge into contracts.  The contract between Alpha and Bravo 
specified the broad areas of responsibility and thus the principal interactions between the actors 
(Figure 3.) for anticipated workloads, flows and types of work.  The contractual norms laid 
down by each organization were used as a framework within which the business model could 
be developed.  The contracts, based on forecasts of workloads and flows, later became 
problematic because of its rigid nature, as the organizations had little accumulated experience 
and forecasts proved to be inaccurate.  The following section explores a series of problems that 
emerged as the business model was put into practice, and describes the attempts of the actors to 
reach solutions. 
 
Problem Solving in the Post Contract Period: Months 6-12 
Problem Solving and Structure 
Respondents were asked to identify the problems they encountered and the process they went 
through to solve them. Brian [Alpha] explained the design engineering process for some of the 
first work packages to come out of his work stream.   
“The plan was for [Bravo] to manage the process and return the completed work.  
They were to do the investigation, compile the drawing alteration, get the 
appropriate signature, action the drawing and then do all the actioning to pre-
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release the definition…They were supposed to do this.  The Bravo guys are doing the 
work, but we [Alpha] are now managing it because they don’t have the capability.”  
 Brian identified the need for experience accumulation.  He was keen to develop know-how and 
know-why so that the Bravo engineers would become more independent.  To facilitate this, he 
eventually made changes to the network structure.   
“Now we’re having them [Bravo] in with us.  They can work more effectively 
because they’re in with people they need to ask questions of…”  (Brian) 
So instead of working remotely, the network structure changed to an embedded structure 
(Figure 4).  These changes took just over six months to institute.  By changing the structure, 
actors were being asked to change their frames of reference and consequently, this met with 
resistance. However, with this structural change Bravo design engineers secured access to the 
Alpha hierarchy.  This decision had transferred a different type of knowledge, know-who.  The 
transparent hierarchy enabled them to solve problems directly as they arose, instead of 
escalating problems up the Bravo hierarchy, then horizontally across to Alpha, before being 
referred down to Alpha front-line workers.  Changes to the hard knowledge transfer 
mechanisms made the sub-structure of the network more transparent to the actors and enabled 
them to develop more effective soft knowledge transfer mechanisms by identifying key actors 
to participate in communities of practice.  
 The structures of Alpha and Bravo represent the sub-structures of the network.  The 
organizational structures gave individual actors a clear sense of their remit.  This appeared to 
provide a frame within which they felt able to exercise their creativity in problem solving at an 
intra-firm and inter-firm level.  As with Brian’s experience, hierarchical boundaries may 
disable as well as enable inter-firm knowledge transfer.  For this reason, the use of the dynamic 
business model to identify and develop soft inter-firm knowledge transfer mechanisms can help 
drive improvements to the network structure.  Brian went on to explain,   
“We’re not blameless in this.  We didn’t identify the behavior and the capability that 
was required for the various roles in the process…and all this came out in time” 
It could be argued that Brian did not identify the correct type of knowledge needed to make the 
supply agreement work.  The ‘know-what’ was missing.  When asked if identifying what 
needed to be changed had been difficult, Brian agreed, 
“Yes … you’re rolling out to new people, it’s a mother hen type of thing, so at first 
you don’t identify shortfalls… but through this experience we did.” 
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Here, the experience of working with Bravo co-created knowledge regarding how to best 
develop supplier relationships.  Had this knowledge been captured in a way that might be 
drawn on in the development of future supplier relationships?  Brian acknowledged,  
 “We haven’t done much of that. I would think… [pause] I hope, that Gary is doing that” 
Gary is Brian’s senior, and as such was thought to hold the responsibility for codifying this 
knowledge.   
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 The observation that hierarchy influences knowledge flows is further illustrated by a 
comparison of the hierarchal structure of the Alpha, Bravo and Charlie teams. For example, 
Gary’s (Director of Engineering Services, Alpha) interactions are predominantly with Mike, 
(Director of Engineering, Bravo).  Mike has a Senior Project Manager, Steve, dealing directly 
with his equivalent at Alpha and Charlie.  Our findings suggest that intra-firm information 
flows were predominantly vertical, while inter-firm information flows were predominantly 
horizontal.  Hierarchical structures seem to influence both intra and inter-firm information 
flows and that these structures become the rigid mechanisms for inter-firm knowledge transfer.  
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(see Hayek, 1945).  Building the network structure became part of the knowledge transfer 
mechanism as well as representing an outcome of inter-firm knowledge transfer as actors made 
structure improvements to the business model (Figure 1, Knowledge Transfer (1)).   
 
















Another issue raised by Brian’s story is that hierarchical structures seem to be related to where 
the knowledge is articulated and codified.  An example, cited by multiple interviewees was that 
of access to IT systems.  Bravo front-line workers experienced problems accessing Alpha’s 
computer networks.  Initially, each front-line worker, through talking to colleagues, would 
eventually find the right person to speak to at Alpha, who would then seek authority and come 
back with the appropriate access rights to solve the problem.     This typically took six to nine 
weeks.  As the outsourcing volume grew, the time delay associated with computer access 
became a major issue.  Eventually, senior Alpha team members got involved and codified the 
procedure.  As a result, the time it took to get computer access was reduced to five days.  In this 
case, it appears that at the firm level, the type of problem identified is likely to affect the 
seniority of the actor most likely to drive business model improvements.    At the individual 
level, hierarchy seems to influence the form of knowledge adopted for inter-firm knowledge 
transfer by the actor.  Knowledge codification happened only when senior managers got 
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 Respondents were asked to describe the effects that changes made to part of the network, 
had on other network members.  Mike [Bravo] was asked to explain how changes to the 
network structure had affected Charlie.    
“We’ve discussed the learning curve [with Alpha], and in principle they understand 
this… they’re directly involved with the training and getting our people and, where 
we’ve needed it, the Charlie people, up to speed…and that’s great.” (Mike) 
Within six months of Brian’s structural change, Bravo had brought Charlie engineers to their 
European office for a four-month period, to provide them with experience of inter-firm routines 
between Alpha-Bravo and the type, quality, and timing of outsourced work to be managed 
within the Bravo-Charlie relationship.  In this regard, the knowledge types identified for 
transfer were know-how and know-why.  This inter-firm knowledge transfer for the most part, 
took the form of experience accumulation and knowledge articulation.  Very little was being 
invested in knowledge codification by any of the actors at this stage.  The industrial network 
literature explains that problem solving tasks are thought to be performed more efficiently face 
to face (Morris et al., 2002; Thompson et al., 2002). However, Amin (2003:125) has argued 
that “through the varied architectures of modern corporate organization, a rich spatial ecology 
of knowledge has become rendered as domestic or relational knowledge and ‘being there’ is no 
longer a constraint of geographical proximity or a special property of place.”    This apparent 
contradiction in the literature goes some way towards explaining the temporal role of face-to-
face learning in the initial establishment and development of communities of practice that once 
initiated through close proximity of actors, can continue to function and develop regardless of 
spatial change.   
 
Problem Solving and Inter-firm Routines 
To learn how to develop appropriate inter-firm routines soft knowledge transfer mechanisms 
were developed.  Meetings were held between Gary and John to map the forecast work streams 
and workflows.  Next, team meetings were held between Gary, John, Mike and Tony, to 
articulate workflow development, monitoring and evaluation plans.  Finally, John, spoke 
directly with the heads of the various engineering units to explain, develop and agree 
workflows.  Two points of interest are: first Alpha drew heavily on its databases that lay down 
set procedures for managing and monitoring work streams.  This codified knowledge acted as a 
blueprint for conceptualizing new routines.  Second, the hierarchical structure appeared to 
affect the way initial inter-firm routines were set up.  One of the first routines to be agreed upon 
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was a quarterly review, including all team members from Alpha and Bravo.  Tony explained 
the objective of the quarterly review as follows, 
 “If we get everyone together, we can check we’re meeting our objectives, in terms of 
quality and deliverables, and if we’ve got the guys managing the work there as well, 
we can understand and deal with any issues arising.” 
Hence, the hierarchical structure influenced who would be present at the review meetings.  The 
objective was to create an inter-firm review routine that contained enough seniority to effect 
agreement and improvement.  The knowledge transfer focused on know-how and know-why, 
through knowledge articulation rather than codification.  Again here, the interplay between 
hard and soft knowledge transfer mechanisms makes their separation problematic.  The routine 
review meeting forms part of the hard knowledge transfer mechanisms, while the discussions 
within the meetings may represent the social production of knowledge. 
 Some respondents reported their frustrations with these reviews.  They felt that, while 
problems were often identified, prioritized and discussed, discussions where not always acted 
upon.  Perhaps this was because knowledge needed to be re-codified so that protocols relevant 
to the specific context could be developed.  Perhaps re-codification was needed before the 
various network actors could make improvements.  This re-codification would drive changes to 
the business model, making it dynamic and flexible for problem solving.  This suggests that the 
‘social’, soft knowledge transfer mechanism was ineffective.  Other inter-firm routines were 
also problematic, for example, Bravo was not being paid on time.  These observations illustrate 
the constant tensions between hard and soft knowledge transfer mechanisms.  While hard 
knowledge transfer mechanisms aim at steady state monitoring and evaluation, the very nature 
of soft knowledge transfer mechanisms, (in that they tend to create new knowledge that 
challenges the status quo), necessitates change. 
 
Problems and Problem Solving: Months 6-12 
 Inter-firm Routine Problems 
Identifying and building inter-firm routines to support the embedded network structure was 
problematic.  Bravo had to deliver some drawings to an Alpha unit. The development of these 
drawings required capabilities from different units within the Bravo network.  One of the tasks 
was to be conducted within the Alpha-embedded Bravo unit.  Other tasks were to be carried out 
elsewhere including Charlie in India.  Alpha treated Bravo as a single supplier and interacted 
with only the embedded Bravo unit. Tony explained,  
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“I was supposed to be delivering to Alpha, [a total solution] and because of the fact 
that communications weren’t really happening we didn’t get any targets as such.  We 
put arbitrary teams in place; we worked them up as best we could.  We got the quality 
right, the delivery dates we weren’t too sure about so we just put arbitrary teams in 
place and there were delays before we actually got to grips with the fact that another 
part of Bravo was supplying them…”   
The problem was discussed and John (Alpha) and Tony (Bravo) worked with each other and 
with the units in their respective firms to develop business routines to prevent the reoccurrence 
of this problem.  Had the correct knowledge need been identified?  The problem appears to be 
that Tony did not know what should be happening.  Tony again,  
“We’ve resolved this [problem] now, and now we talk to Alpha every two weeks…and 
we have developed a form that gives us transparency and records all work in 
progress, where it resides, responsibilities, time, costs and targets…” 
In this case, the problem had significant financial implications for Alpha.  Where the costs of 
error are high the need to institutionalize knowledge in hard knowledge transfer mechanisms, is 
greater (Lanzara et al., 2007).  Alpha and Bravo codified knowledge in order to prevent re-
occurrence of this problem.   The transparency afforded daily problem solving facilitated by the 
embedded structure enabled Tony and John to share experience accumulation and knowledge 
articulation of their environment.  They were able to improve inter-firm routines to increase the 
effectiveness of the business model. The information flows that the network and organizational 
structures support, represent the inter-firm routines that begin to emerge.  However, where 
problems did not appear to have significant implications for Alpha, problem solving attempts 
appeared to be less effective.   
 One problem, that had little consequence for Alpha was that Bravo was not being paid on 
time.  Alpha engineering units are responsible for confirming work completed and the Alpha 
procurement function for actioning payment.  Constant challenges, regarding evidence of 
completed work, were made by the procurement function.  The problem lay in the tracking 
work done in a ‘simultaneous engineering environment’.  Simultaneous engineering requires 
that multiple design tasks take place at the same time instead of in sequence.  Thus, changes to 
one component, for example, part of an engine, has direct implications for other tasks 
including, the tool to maintain the part and the monitoring equipment fitted to the part.  These 
minor but frequent changes make tracking work done a complex task.  Steve (Bravo) explains 
the process, 
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 “In the design process you have a series of design gates that you go through to make 
sure you’re doing the right things at the right time…You’d have a Preliminary Design 
Review; the guys would get together and look at very early concepts of what you were 
trying to do, and you’d have a couple of senior engineers from [Alpha] and some of our 
guys and they’d agree between them - yes, we’re going in the right direction, lets get on 
with it.  The next review would be a Critical Design Review where you’ve firmed up the 
design itself, you’ve got some nice 3D models, and you’ve perhaps done some stress 
work, and this is really the final sign-off before you would do all the detailed drawings.   
However, because Alpha had previously had problems with the qualities of drawings, Alpha 
engineers were insisting that all detailed drawings were completed in time for the Critical 
Design Review.  Steve again, 
 “Some of the large stuff, you can have up to 20 sheets of drawings…If it’s got to be 
changed that can be done….  but we had to go back and alter all 20 sheets.  That’s a lot 
of work being thrown away.  And all the time we’ve got our guys [Bravo] looking at 
budgets and costs and their [Alpha] engineers insisting that we get up to this level.  And 
it was causing… well a lot of money was spent.  
Steve highlighted the tension between the different roles and objectives of the actors by trying 
to propose a solution that brought a closer alignment between the two.   
 “I suggested to Alpha that their engineers should be given some commercial 
responsibility.  Because what happens, is you get the engineers disease where they want 
it completed, polished and just so – and sometimes you’ve just not got the time, You’ve 
not the money and if you can get it so that it’s functional, and it does the job… it’s ok.  
What happens is that when you get the thing designed, the commercial side is kind-a 
left.”.  (Steve) 
Our analysis revealed that the lack of information flows across function boundaries prevented 
inter-firm knowledge transfer.  Specifically limited information flows between the engineering 
units commissioning work and the procurement function responsible for signing-off and 
actioning payment on work done were not improved.  Chris, a senior buyer at Alpha, did try to 
chase payments, and in the beginning this was effective, but as time went on and inter-firm 
routines were not improved, he did less.  Tony and John (see Figure 3) tried to set up ‘block 
purchase orders’ so that not every ‘job’ had to have a separate invoice raised and could be 
booked against an account code.  This worked for raising orders more efficiently, but did not 
have a similar effect with securing payment.   
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 Bravo knew that the problem lay in the engineering unit placing a low priority on the 
tracking paperwork but could not identify an individual actor prepared to institute the required 
change; perhaps because Alpha knew that Bravo were reluctant to cease supply until payments 
were made (Alpha were important customers for Bravo).  Bravo did not have the transparency 
of Alpha’s structure beyond the engineering units directly involved in the three work streams.  
The type of inter-firm knowledge transfer Bravo needed was know-who. In this regard, 
developing appropriate inter-firm routines to solve this problem required greater structure 
transparency.  This would perhaps allow Bravo to identify appropriate actors to discuss inter-
firm routine improvements.  This issue highlights a limitation of ‘communities of practice’.  
Where individuals do not share common practices (for example our engineers and purchasers) 
they do not appear to co-create solutions and new knowledge. One party can perceive a 
problem as insignificant, regardless of its importance to other actors.  Our finds suggest that 




Problem Solving: Months 12-15 
A problem that became prevalent in this period was facilitating network transparency so that 
the relevant actors had visibility of work-in-progress.  Fortnightly meetings with frontline 
network managers from the different work streams began to incorporate effectiveness measures 
including, work stream allocation and completion rates, satisfaction with work-in-progress, 
work completed, and delivery time scales.  Changes to inter-firm routines took the form of 
minor modification.  Almost all modifications took place on the basis of knowledge articulation 
and emerged through the social interaction of actors.  This is in keeping with Howard-
Grenville’s (2005) observations of flexible routines.  That is, actors involved in the routines 
apply their judgment and choose which aspects of routines to invoke and how to invoke them.  
Further, these judgments are made, almost exclusively through knowledge articulation.  The 
actors focused on learning know-how and know-why and it appears to be this combination of 
knowledge types that leads to the development of flexible routines.     
 
Problem Solving: Months 15-18 
 The problem of transparency, and specifically, knowing how the actors in the network 
operate, led Bravo to bring in someone specifically to co-ordinate, monitor and evaluate inter-
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firm routines.  The creation of this role was a direct response to some of the problems being 
faced by the network.  Part of Steve’s role was to identify key personnel within Alpha (and 
other network firms) who might drive change to improve the effectiveness of the offshore 
business model; in other words, identifying to whom knowledge should be transferred.  He 
explained how he had tried to persuade Alpha to give Bravo ‘design/make authority’, for a new 
work stream.  He had been unsuccessful. His argument was that if he had ‘design/make 
authority’ he could avoid many current problems.  The new inter- firm routines that this would 
have created for the procurement function were met with resistance (Uzzi, 1997).  The 
procurement function’s lack of flexibility with inter-firm routines frustrated Alpha’s own 
objectives as well as those of other actors.  Here the hard knowledge transfer mechanisms acted 
as disablers of knowledge transfer, being rigid and inflexible when the need for change had 
been identified.  Steve described the benefits that might have accrued. 
“…, we should have been able to try and bring cost down.  I would have liked to have 
been able to secure that procurement [the manufacturing of the tooling] and to 
manage that on site …..It would have helped us manage the delivery; we could have 
controlled it more.” 
Being able to identify individual actors, to whom knowledge can be transferred (know-who), 
seems to be important to the effectiveness of knowledge transfer mechanisms effecting 
improvements in the business model.  Identifying individual actors, within specific functions or 
units, appears to be an important part of the knowledge articulation and codification.  But again 
a tension can be identified here.  The social life of information, as Brown and Duguid (2000), 
call it, works on the principle that you cannot control and codify the co-creation of new 
knowledge.  Rather the focus of mangers should be on creating learning spaces (Nonaka et al., 
1998) which might be physical (the office), virtual (e-mail, teleconferences) or mental (shared 
experience, ideas).   
 The ‘design/make authority’ event described above raises a further issue regarding the 
disparate nature of knowledge (Tsoukas, 2000).  The objectives of the different functions are 
conflicting, and in this way do not represent the ‘whole pattern of changes of the larger 
economic system’ (Hayek, 1945).  Thus, knowledge remains fragmented and dispersed within 
Alpha and as such creates a barrier to inter-firm knowledge transfer.  The frontline actors 
within Alpha Procurement cannot see (and do not have the knowledge of) other actors’ 
objectives; specifically those associated with the offshore business model.  They therefore 
make the best decisions they can on the basis of partial and inappropriate information.  This 
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affects their judgment of how to apply and enforce inter-firm routines.  Therefore, they make 
decisions in the best interest of the procurement functions rather than improvements in the 
business model.  As Hayek (1945) observes, 
“…practically every individual has some advantage over all others in that he 
possesses unique information of which beneficial use might be made, but of which use 
can be made only if the decisions depending on it are left to him or made with his 
active cooperation.” (521-522) 
It appears that in order for inter-firm routines to stay flexible, frontline actors, (what Hayek 
(1945) refers to as, “the man on the spot”) operating in communities of practice need to be 
empowered to solve their day-to-day operational problems.   
 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS  
This longitudinal study generates insights into inter-firm knowledge transfer through the 
examination of a dynamic business model incorporating three firms.  Inter-firm knowledge 
transfer was found to play an integral role in making the offshore business model dynamic.  
The structures, routines and problem solving activities that comprise the business model were 
found to act as inter-firm knowledge transfer mechanisms for multiple types of knowledge.  
The analysis of empirical findings has uncovered the need for both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ inter-firm 
knowledge transfer mechanisms to drive improvements to dynamic business models. While 
structures and routines were found to act as the ‘hard’ inter-firm knowledge transfer 
mechanisms of the supply network portrayed in the business model, changes to structures and 
routines were found to be manifestations of soft inter-firm knowledge transfer.  These changes 
represent the realization of skilled performance, learned through situated practice and 
emulation of experienced performers (Bångens et al., 2002).  Soft inter-firm knowledge 
transfer mechanisms emerged through the development of inter-firm communities of practice.  
Thus, the model presented in Figure 1. appears to be representative of the different mechanisms 
of inter-firm knowledge transfer.  The process is initially sequential, beginning with choice of 
network structure, development of routines, problem identification and ultimately problem 
solving through iterative change to structure and routines.  The cyclical nature of dynamic 
business models is consistent with knowledge evolution theory both within the firm (Nonaka, 
1994; Zollo et al., 2002), between firms (Koza et al., 1998) and across geographic ‘space’ 
(Amin, 2003).  In this way, the paper recognizes the multiple geographies and practices of 
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learning that emerge as managers discover how to build a supply network.  These findings 
provide a contribution in two key ways. 
 The first contribution relates to the types of knowledge that are involved in inter-firm 
knowledge transfer.  To-date the knowledge literature has typically focused on two types of 
knowledge: know-how (Bångens et al., 2002; Brown et al., 2000) and know-why 
(Faulconbridge, 2006; Zollo et al., 2002).  Adopting a longitudinal, network perspective on 
knowledge types our findings revealed that other knowledge types can be fundamental in 
learning to build a supply network.  Specifically, know-what is crucial in developing shared 
frames of what the supply network is trying to achieve.  Similarly, know-who is central to 
instigating improvements in practice.  These findings contribute to a more holistic approach to 
what inter-firm knowledge transfer might mean for managers learning in networks (Möller et 
al., 2006).   In this regard, holding a broader set of classification that can be used to identify the 
different types of knowledge that firms need, to work effectively together, represents an 
important contribution to how we understand inter-firm knowledge transfer. 
 The second contribution relates to how these different types of knowledge are 
transferred between firms.  Two distinct types of knowledge transfer mechanisms are 
identified: ‘hard’ and ‘soft’.  Hard inter-firm knowledge transfer mechanisms act as both 
enablers and disablers for inter-firm knowledge transfer.   Hard mechanisms can be understood 
as the architecture of the business network that ‘institutionalizes’ how firms interact and learn 
from each other (Hasselbladh et al., 2000; Morris et al., 2005).  This architecture is provided by 
the structures and routines that facilitate knowledge flows within and between firms.  When 
conceptualizing the structures and routines of their supply network, firms are endeavoring to 
identify the formal channels for inter-firm interactions and consequently, inter-firm knowledge 
transfer.  As Alpha’s dynamic business model evolved, the network knowledge became 
embedded in durable artifacts; structures, stories, rules and routines.  Structures and routines 
were used as cognitive frames through which individuals could make sense of their world and 
their practical dealings.  Our findings suggest that hard knowledge transfer mechanisms can 
represent rigidity and can lead to a resistance to change and a ‘stickiness’ in the knowledge that 
has become embedded in the network (Szulanski, 1996).  For example, it took Brian six months 
to change the network structure so that Bravo employees worked alongside Alpha engineers.  
Similarly, Steve continues to strive to resolve the problem of inappropriate inflexible routines 
that unnecessarily demanded multiple iterations of drawings.  These observations highlight the 
need to understand how managers counter the rigidity of hard knowledge transfer mechanisms.  
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Our findings suggest that increasing the transparency of hard knowledge transfer mechanisms, 
(codifying and sharing visible hierarchies across organizational boundaries, explicit allocation 
of roles and responsibilities, documented procedures and routines) together with the fostering 
of ‘soft’ knowledge transfer mechanisms might go some way towards addressing this issue.   
 Hard knowledge transfer mechanisms can lead to what Faulconbridge (2006:537) calls 
‘difficulties associated with the implementation of culturally and institutionally sticky best 
practice outside the place of production.”   That is, the direct application of Alpha routines at 
Charlie may not be appropriate, practicable or possible.  Hard inter-firm knowledge transfer 
mechanisms represent ways of circulating knowledge to develop shared best practice. 
Transparent hard mechanisms make it easier for actors to identify other key actors and develop 
‘soft’ knowledge transfer mechanisms through joint problem solving activities.  
 Soft knowledge transfer mechanisms promote the social production of new knowledge 
that allows for the development of new ideas and knowledge through social practice.  Here, the 
aim is not to replicate what is being done in other parts of the network, but to learn from others’ 
ideas and experiences.  Our findings show that when learning how to carry out specific 
engineering design tasks, social production of knowledge was fostered and individual actors 
worked together across firm boundaries to identify and solve engineering problems (Nohria et 
al., 1997).  In this regard, soft inter-firm knowledge transfer mechanisms might be better 
understood as the social production of new knowledge rather than knowledge transfer per se.   
On one level, two distinct approaches to learning and practice can been identified. Hard 
knowledge transfer mechanisms allow for the circulation and ‘transfer’ of inter-firm knowledge 
relating to management practices, while soft knowledge transfer mechanisms foster the social 
production of new knowledge allowing actors to adapt and apply their learning about specific 
skill sets (in our case, engineering design) in their own specific cultural and institutional 
contexts.  However, as distinct as the two approaches to learning and practices appear, they also 
seem difficult to divorce from each other. 
 Our findings suggest that there is interplay between hard and soft inter-firm knowledge 
transfer mechanisms.  While hard knowledge transfer mechanisms create a framework within 
which to operate, soft knowledge transfer mechanisms continuously identify ways to change 
the steady state, thus extending the concept of dynamic capabilities to the wider business 
network (Möller et al., 2005).  This is consistent with the findings of Brown and Duguid (2000) 
who describe how the inevitable frictions emerging from the conflicting ideas of different 
actors within a network result in ‘the sort of improvisational sparks necessary for igniting 
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organizational innovation.’  In this way, the design of hard inter-firm knowledge transfer 
mechanisms (network structure and inter-firm routines), though necessary, is not by itself 
sufficient for the production of novelty (Amin, 2003).  Rather, the need for firms to foster, 
support and value the problem solving activities that emerge within the ‘soft’ knowledge 
transfer mechanism of ‘communities of practice’ seems central to business model 
improvement.  Further, the ‘space’ that these communities of practice inhabit need not be 
restricted by geography (Faulconbridge, 2006).  When Bravo brought Charlie design engineers 
to their offices to learn about their routines and practices, the continued interaction between 
them, via email and telephone, bridged the physical space so that problem solving could be 
continued after their return to Charlie, some thousands of miles away.  These observations have 
two important implications.   
 First, it highlights the need for networks of firms to jointly foster and support soft 
knowledge transfer mechanisms beyond each individual firm’s own boundaries, regardless of 
geographic distance. When our organizations did not value the proposed solutions and 
innovations emerging from the inter-firm communities of practice, problems persisted.  This is 
consistent with the works of Wenger (1998), Orr (1996) and Brown and Duguid (2000) who 
suggest that communities of practice emerge through the support of daily interactions of actors  
held together by shared purpose and expertise.  Amin (2003) suggests ways by which ‘learning 
in talk’ might be engineered within these communities; away-days, regular meetings and 
(tele)conferences.  This poses significant questions for managers pursuing offshore business 
models where their focus is primarily on efficiency.  The resources and investment required for 
the promotion and mobilization of communities of practice appears central to the success of the 
business model, forcing managers to re-evaluate the efficiency versus effectiveness tradeoffs 
they might be prepared to make. 
 Second, whether knowledge transfer mechanisms are hard or soft appears to affect the 
‘form’ knowledge adopts.  Hard knowledge transfer mechanisms were typically represented by 
codified knowledge, for example, hierarchical organization structures captured in organization 
charts, or procedural flow diagrams to depict process and routines.  In contrast, soft knowledge 
transfer mechanisms did not appear to have any physical expression, but were typically 
manifested through social cohesion – the sharing of experiences through practice, observation 
and articulation.  Hence, while the dynamic business model aims to engender constant 
improvement through continuous problem solving, the finding that firms invested more in hard 
knowledge transfer mechanisms, and that this tends to happen at the beginning of operations is 
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perhaps not surprising.  In line with Zollo and Winter (2002), we found that using knowledge in 
this way, meant our organizations were focused on building the ‘know-how’ (hard 
mechanisms) of the business network (Bångens et al., 2002), and failed to capitalize on the 
‘know-why’ or ‘know-who’ (soft mechanisms).  Know-why is important because it offers firms 
the advantage of being able to work out when inter-firm routines can simply be adopted and 
when they need to be adapted and flexible (Argote, 1982; Brown et al., 1997; Howard-
Grenville, 2005).  For example, ‘know-why’ might have changed the procurement functions 
approach to the Bravo payment problem.  This contributes to inter-firm knowledge transfer 
literature by extending our understanding of investments in knowledge transfer mechanisms 
(Dunbar et al., 2006; Hayek, 1945; Karamanos, 2003). 
 In sum, our findings suggest that dynamic business models are useful tools for 
organizations working out types of knowledge that need to be transferred between firms and 
inter-firm knowledge transfer mechanisms designed to solve inter-firm problems.   Detailed 
dynamic business models allow firms to identify what types of knowledge are needed, where 
valuable knowledge resides within the network and facilitates the accumulation, sharing and 
co-creation of new knowledge.   As we have seen, the process of conceptualizing and 
developing a dynamic business model is an inter-firm knowledge transfer initiative itself, but 
the level of investment in knowledge transfer mechanisms appears to fluctuate depending on 
time and context.      Despite the recognition that a dynamic business model facilitates a high 
level of investment in knowledge transfer at the start of its operation, it also encourages a 
continued investment in soft inter-firm knowledge transfer mechanisms to continuously 
improve network structures and inter-firm routines.  This is what makes the business model 
‘dynamic’.  Hard inter-firm knowledge transfer mechanisms are used to frame how actors 
might do things better.  Yet our findings suggest that it might be possible for networks to build 
a competitive advantage, improving effectiveness and efficiency, if they also learn to use soft 
knowledge transfer mechanisms to understand what, with whom and why the improvements 
occurred.  An implication of this finding is that firms need to invest in both hard and soft 
knowledge transfer mechanisms to leverage the effectiveness of the supply network.  
 While this research helps to explain how inter-firm knowledge transfer is involved in 
the creation of dynamic business models, our understanding of inter-firm knowledge transfer, is 
however, still in its infancy.  Our findings identified different types of knowledge that appear 
valuable in learning to build a supply network.  But consider the words of Rudyard Kipling 
(1907),  
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“I kept six honest serving men: 
(They taught me all I knew) 
Their names are What and Where and When 
And How and Why and Who.”    
If we were to precede each of Kipling’s ‘honest serving men’ with the word ‘know’: know-
what, know-where, know-when, know-how, know-why, know-who, a rich tapestry of possible 
inter-firm knowledge transfers emerge.  Taking a more holistic approach to the types of 
knowledge that need to be created and transferred, in different contexts, might generate 
valuable insights.   
 A limiting factor in our research was the inability to secure direct access to the offshore 
company.   Little is known about the impact of culture and language on inter-firm knowledge 
transfer.  This represents a worthy route of enquiry for scholars.  Equally, our research focused 
on a single business model.  Different business models, in different industries and countries, are 
likely to reveal different problems.  It would be both valuable and insightful to explore the 
characteristics of a wide variety of problem solving activities as manifestations of inter-firm 
knowledge transfer.  Related to this issue, further research is needed to help managers identify 
when to invest valuable and scarce resources in the development of communities of practice 
across significant physical distances.  In the offshore business model we investigated, there was 
potential for competition between the internal engineering units and the outsourced engineering 
units and this may have been responsible for the lack of knowledge codification in certain 
circumstances. While this issue fell beyond the remit of this study, it would be interesting to 
examine how the tensions between cooperation and competition affect inter-firm knowledge 
transfer.  Finally, bearing in mind the emphasis placed on the value of knowledge codification 
in this study, further research into the investments made, the value and the significance of 
different manifestations of knowledge would be beneficial. 
   
Endnotes: 
 
1 For a detailed explanation of activities in the knowledge evolution cycle, see Zollo and Winter 
(2002: 343) 
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